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Aboriginal Over-representation and 
R. v. Gladue: Where We Were, 
Where We Are and  
Where We Might Be Going 
Jonathan Rudin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Clearly the most significant development in the criminal law for 
Aboriginal people over the last 25 years was the decision by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Gladue.1 As significant and important as  
the Gladue decision was, eight years later, rates of Aboriginal over-
representation in the Canadian prison system continue to rise. 
This paper will sketch out the background and history behind the 
Gladue decision, the impact or lack of impact of the decision on 
Aboriginal rates of over-representation and the role that the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 notably section 15, has played and 
might play in this issue over the coming years. 
II. THE PRE-GLADUE ENVIRONMENT 
Aboriginal over-representation is a phenomenon of post-war Canada. 
Prior to the end of the Second World War, Aboriginal people were not 
over-represented in prison, but the numbers of Aboriginal people in 
Canadian jails began to increase after the war.3 Over-representation was 
a notorious fact in Aboriginal communities by the 1970s. After all, it is 
                                                                                                            
*
 Program Director at Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto and member of the faculty of 
the Law and Society Program in the Division of Social Science at York University. 
1
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
2
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
3
 A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, 
Vol. 1, The Justice System and Aboriginal People (Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991), at 101 
[hereinafter “Aboriginal Justice Inquiry”].  
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not hard to notice that your friends and relatives are going to jail in 
disproportionate numbers. In the broader, non-Aboriginal community, 
Aboriginal over-representation only came to the fore in the late 1980s. 
In 1988, the Canadian Bar Association (“CBA”) Committee on 
Imprisonment and Release issued Locking Up Natives in Canada, a paper 
by Professor Michael Jackson of the University of British Columbia.4 
The report was adopted by the CBA at its annual meeting in 1989.5 The 
report detailed levels of Aboriginal over-representation throughout Canada, 
with a particular emphasis on the western provinces. The report showed 
that approximately 10 per cent of federal male inmates and 13 per cent 
of federal female inmates were Aboriginal.6 The numbers were even 
greater in many provincial jail populations, particularly in the Western 
provinces.7 Even more worrying was the fact that rates of over-
representation were increasing over time. 
The impact of Locking Up Natives8 was felt in provincial inquiries 
into issues relating to Aboriginal people and the justice system. In 1991 
Manitoba released its two-volume Aboriginal Justice Inquiry report9 and 
in that same year Alberta released Justice on Trial — Report on the Task 
Force on the Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and 
Metis People of Alberta.10 Both these reports highlighted the issue of 
Aboriginal over-representation and raised concerns about the need to 
address the trend of ever-increasing rates of over-representation. 
Over the same time period, non-Aboriginal Canadians became more 
aware of Aboriginal issues through both the Oka crisis11 and Elijah 
                                                                                                            
4
 M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association 
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 215 
[hereinafter “Locking Up Natives”]. 
5
 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on 
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 29. 
6
 M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association 
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23, at 220. 
7
 M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association 
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23, at 220. 
8
 M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association 
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23. 
9
 A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, 
Vol. 1, The Justice System and Aboriginal People (Winnipeg, Queen’s Printer, 1991). 
10
 (Edmonton: Solicitor General, 1991). 
11
 For 78 days in the summer of 1990, the Mohawks of Kanesatake occupied land in the 
town of Oka, Quebec that they maintained was their traditional territory. Eventually the Canadian 
Army was called in, in an attempt to resolve the conflict. A good summary of the events can be 
found in G. York & L. Pindera, People of the Pines (Toronto: Little Brown, 1991). 
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Harper’s stand against the Meech Lake Accord.12 In the early 1990s, the 
federal government created the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
(“RCAP”), whose report on criminal justice — Bridging the Cultural 
Divide — was released in 1996.13 In that report, the Commission found 
Aboriginal over-representation to be “injustice personified”. The first 
major finding of the report was that: 
The Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal peoples 
of Canada — First Nations, Inuit and Métis people, on-reserve and  
off-reserve, urban and rural — in all territorial and governmental 
jurisdictions. The principal reason for this crushing failure is the 
fundamentally different world views of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people with respect to such elemental issues as the substantive content 
of justice and the process of achieving justice.14 
At the same time as the Royal Commission was releasing its report 
on justice, Parliament was concluding its first major review of sentencing. 
The result of this process was Bill C-41,15 a comprehensive sentencing 
bill that moved the principles of sentencing out of the common law and 
enshrined them in the Criminal Code.16 The Bill included section 718.2(e). 
The section read: 
 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into 
consideration the following principles: 
. . . . . 
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable 
in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with 
particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders. 
The section is unique among common law countries with Aboriginal 
populations as it is the only statute that specifically directs judges to 
                                                                                                            
12
 The Meech Lake Accord was an attempt by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to amend 
the Canadian Constitution. Elijah Harper was an NDP MLA in Manitoba and a former chief of the 
Red Sucker Creek First Nation in northern Manitoba. The Accord required the consent of the provinces 
and Harper prevented the Accord from coming to a vote in the legislature. Harper’s opposition was 
grounded in the failure of the Accord to address any issues important to Aboriginal people.  
13
 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on 
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996) [hereinafter 
“Bridging the Cultural Divide”]. 
14
 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on 
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 309. 
15
 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, 
S.C. 1995, c. 22. 
16
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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consider the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. In explaining why 
the section was placed in the Criminal Code,17 then Justice Minister 
Alan Rock said to the Commons Justice Committee: 
The reason we referred there specifically to aboriginal persons is that 
they are sadly over-represented in the prison population in Canada. I 
think it was the Manitoba justice inquiry that found that although 
Aboriginal people make up only 12% of the population of Manitoba, 
they comprise over 50% of the prison inmates. Nationally aboriginal 
persons represent about 2% of Canada’s population, but they represent 
10.6% of persons in prison. Obviously there’s a problem here …What 
we’re trying to do, particularly having regard to the initiatives in the 
aboriginal communities to achieve community justice, is to encourage 
the courts to look at alternatives where it’s consistent with the protection 
of the public — alternatives to jail — and not simply resort to the easy 
answer in every case.18 
Not surprisingly, the section came in for criticism. Both the Bloc 
Québécois and the Reform Party (as it then was) voiced strong opposition 
to the inclusion of what to them were considerations of race into the 
sentencing process.19 
The amendments to the Code had been passed by the time RCAP 
released Bridging the Cultural Divide. In the context of that report, the 
Commission was not overly enthused about the section. It said: 
This statement of purposes and principles certainly does not preclude 
imposing a sentence that emphasizes restorative and healing goals, but 
these are not given priority nor are they seen as anchoring the sentencing 
process.20 
The Commission then went on to contrast what an Aboriginal statement of 
purposes and principles for criminal law would look like. 
                                                                                                            
17
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
18
 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence, no. 62 (November 17, 1994), at 62. 
19
 Hansard (September 20, 1994) 5876; Hansard (November 19, 2004) 1205. 
20
 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on 
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 240. 
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III. R. V. GLADUE 
The precise meaning of section 718.2(e) was not evident on the passage 
of Bill C-41.21 The enactment of the section did not lead immediately to 
any noticeable change in sentencing practices. Like much else in the legal 
landscape, it awaited a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to map 
out its contours. That moment came in R. v. Gladue,22 decided in 1999. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in 1998 set the stage for R. v. Gladue23 
by deciding R. v. Williams.24 Williams was a case dealing with challenging 
jurors for potential bias based on the race of the accused. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Parks,25 which upheld such questioning in 
the context of black accused persons, had not been appealed to the Supreme 
Court and so this was the Court’s first opportunity to consider the question 
of challenging jurors for potential racial bias. 
Mr. Williams was an Aboriginal person charged with robbery in 
Victoria, British Columbia. His lawyer wished to question jurors regarding 
the possibility that they might be biased against Mr. Williams because 
he was an Aboriginal person. The trial judge denied the motion and the 
B.C. Court of Appeal upheld the decision. Essentially, the courts found 
that there was a presumption of juror impartiality that could not be 
overturned on the basis of evidence of generalized antipathy to members 
of certain groups.26 
Given the significance of the case and concern among lawyers in 
Ontario that the R. v. Parks27 decision might be in jeopardy, the case 
attracted six interveners: the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario, 
the African Canadian Legal Clinic, the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, 
the Criminal Lawyers Association (Ontario) and Aboriginal Legal Services 
of Toronto (“ALST”). ALST was the only organization whose mandate 
was to deal with issues relating to Aboriginal people. 
The Supreme Court reversed the B.C. Court of Appeal and ordered 
a new trial where the accused could question prospective jurors regarding 
                                                                                                            
21
 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, 
S.C. 1995, c. 22. 
22
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
23
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
24
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (S.C.C.). 
25
 [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 15 O.R. (3d) 324 (Ont. C.A.). 
26
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 7 (S.C.C.). 
27
 [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 15 O.R. (3d) 324 (Ont. C.A.). 
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prejudice against Aboriginal people. For a unanimous court, McLachlin J. 
(as she then was) wrote: 
 Although they acknowledged the existence of widespread bias 
against aboriginals, both Esson C.J. and the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal held that the evidence did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility 
that prospective jurors would be partial. In my view, there was ample 
evidence that this widespread prejudice included elements that could 
have affected the impartiality of jurors. Racism against aboriginals 
includes stereotypes that relate to credibility, worthiness and criminal 
propensity. As the Canadian Bar Association stated in Locking up 
Natives in Canada: A Report of the Committee of the Canadian Bar 
Association on Imprisonment and Release (1988), at p. 5: 
Put at its baldest, there is an equation of being drunk, Indian and 
in prison. Like many stereotypes, this one has a dark underside. It 
reflects a view of native people as uncivilized and without a 
coherent social or moral order. The stereotype prevents us from 
seeing native people as equals. 
There is evidence that this widespread racism has translated into systemic 
discrimination in the criminal justice system: see Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on 
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada, at p. 33; Royal 
Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution: Findings and 
Recommendations, vol. 1 (1989), at p. 162; Report on the Cariboo-
Chilcotin Justice Inquiry (1993), at p. 11. Finally, as Esson C.J. noted, 
tensions between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals have increased in 
recent years as a result of developments in such areas as land claims 
and fishing rights. These tensions increase the potential of racist jurors 
siding with the Crown as the perceived representative of the majority’s 
interests.28 
Having dipped their toes in the issue of the treatment of Aboriginal 
people by the justice system, the Court jumped in with both feet in 1999 
with their decision in R. v. Gladue.29 Gladue concerned itself squarely 
with the interpretation of section 718.2(e). Perhaps because of the perceived 
lack of universality of the issue, the case attracted only three interveners 
— the Attorneys General of Canada and Alberta, and Aboriginal Legal 
Services of Toronto. 
                                                                                                            
28
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 58 (S.C.C.). 
29
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
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Jamie Gladue pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the death of her 
common law husband, Reuben Beaver, in Nanaimo, British Columbia. 
At her sentencing, defence counsel asked that the judge apply section 
718.2(e). 
 The trial judge noted that both the appellant and the deceased were 
aboriginal, but stated that they were living in an urban area off-reserve 
and not “within the aboriginal community as such”. He found that there 
were not any special circumstances arising from their aboriginal status 
that he should take into consideration. He stated that the offence was a 
very serious one, for which the appropriate sentence was three years’ 
imprisonment with a ten-year weapons prohibition.30 
R. v. Gladue31 was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court 
written by Cory and Iacobucci JJ. The decision provides an examination 
of the purpose behind section 718.2(e), including a critique of Canada’s 
overuse of incarceration generally. While section 718.2(e) is often referred 
to as “the Aboriginal sentencing section”, the direction to judges regarding 
Aboriginal people is found only at the end of the section. The section 
clearly has applicability to all offenders and, as this paper points out, it is 
largely non-Aboriginal people who have benefited from these amendments. 
R. v. Gladue32 is remarkable for the direct language the Court uses in 
addressing the issue of Aboriginal over-representation. Referring to the 
major works on the issue of over-representation (Locking Up Natives,33 
the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry34 and Bridging the Cultural Divide),35 the 
Court found that: 
 These findings cry out for recognition of the magnitude and 
gravity of the problem, and for responses to alleviate it. The figures 
are stark and reflect what may fairly be termed a crisis in the Canadian 
criminal justice system. The drastic overrepresentation of aboriginal 
peoples within both the Canadian prison population and the criminal 
justice system reveals a sad and pressing social problem. It is reasonable 
to assume that Parliament, in singling out aboriginal offenders for distinct 
                                                                                                            
30
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 18 (S.C.C.). 
31
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
32
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
33
 M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association 
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23. 
34
 A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, 
Vol. 1, The Justice System and Aboriginal People (Winnipeg, Queen’s Printer, 1991). 
35
 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on 
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996). 
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sentencing treatment in section 718.2(e), intended to attempt to redress 
this social problem to some degree. The provision may properly be 
seen as Parliament’s direction to members of the judiciary to inquire 
into the causes of the problem and to endeavour to remedy it, to the 
extent that a remedy is possible through the sentencing process. 
 It is clear that sentencing innovation by itself cannot remove the 
causes of aboriginal offending and the greater problem of aboriginal 
alienation from the criminal justice system. The unbalanced ratio of 
imprisonment for aboriginal offenders flows from a number of sources, 
including poverty, substance abuse, lack of education, and the lack of 
employment opportunities for aboriginal people. It arises also from 
bias against aboriginal people and from an unfortunate institutional 
approach that is more inclined to refuse bail and to impose more and 
longer prison terms for aboriginal offenders. There are many aspects 
of this sad situation which cannot be addressed in these reasons. What 
can and must be addressed, though, is the limited role that sentencing 
judges will play in remedying injustice against aboriginal peoples in 
Canada. Sentencing judges are among those decision-makers who have 
the power to influence the treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice 
system. They determine most directly whether an aboriginal offender 
will go to jail, or whether other sentencing options may be employed 
which will play perhaps a stronger role in restoring a sense of balance 
to the offender, victim, and community, and in preventing future crime.36 
The Court also quoted the first major finding from Bridging the Cultural 
Divide on the failure of the criminal justice system in relation to Aboriginal 
people and called it a “striking yet representative statement”.37 
R. v. Gladue38 offers as clear and direct a statement of the problem 
of Aboriginal over-representation as could ever be expected from an 
institution such as the Supreme Court of Canada. The frankness that the 
Court showed in discussing the problem made the decision headline 
news across the country.39 
As a statement of the problem, R. v. Gladue40 bears repeated reading 
and stands as a condemnation of the way in which Aboriginal people 
                                                                                                            
36
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at paras. 64-65 (S.C.C.). 
37
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 62 (S.C.C.). Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal People and Criminal 
Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 309. 
38
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
39
 For example, the headline in the Saturday April 24, 1999, Globe and Mail was “Top 
court appalled as Natives fill Canada’s jails.” 
40
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
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have been treated by the criminal justice system. It is significant that the 
Court found over-representation to be “a crisis in the Canadian criminal 
justice system”.41 The court recognized that the issue was not that 
Aboriginal people were necessarily committing more crime than  
non-Aboriginal people, but rather that Aboriginal people went to jail for 
their actions much more frequently than non-Aboriginal people. 
The very real concern that the Court expressed about Aboriginal 
over-representation is likely one of the reasons that in 2001 the Speech 
from the Throne stated: 
It is a tragic reality that too many Aboriginal people are finding 
themselves in conflict with the law. Canada must take the measures 
needed to significantly reduce the percentage of Aboriginal people 
entering the criminal justice system, so that within a generation it is no 
higher than the Canadian average.42 
Unfortunately, six years on from the Throne Speech, this target is moving 
further and further out of reach. 
R. v. Gladue43 does not just describe the problem of Aboriginal 
over-representation; the decision was also concerned with setting out a 
way for judges to address the sentencing of Aboriginal people on a daily 
basis. While the Court set out guidelines for judges, they have proven 
not to be as clear as the Court’s statement of the problem. 
The Court instructed judges to look at two sets of factors when 
sentencing an Aboriginal offender: 
(A) The unique systemic or background factors which may have played 
a part in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the courts; 
and 
(B) The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be 
appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or 
her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.44 
In terms of systemic factors, the Court said that judges should take judicial 
notice of the broad systemic factors that have affected Aboriginal people. 
This presumably extends to the impact of colonialist government policies 
                                                                                                            
41
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 64 (S.C.C.). 
42
 Speech from the Throne to Open the 37th Parliament of Canada, December 2001. 
Volume 139, Issue 76, 1st Session, 37th Parliament, Edited Hansard, No. 2, at para. 1530, available 
online: Senate <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/002_2001-01-30/ 
HAN002-E.htm#LINKT2>. 
43
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
44
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 66 (S.C.C.). 
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such as residential schools and the mass adoption of Aboriginal children 
in what has been referred to as “the 60s scoop”. 
The Court was also clear that section 718.2(e) applied to all Aboriginal 
people, wherever they lived, whether they might be seen as assimilated 
or not.45 Courts were required to consider the section for every Aboriginal 
person unless the offender expressly waived consideration of R. v. Gladue.46 
The fact that Aboriginal-specific alternatives might not always be available 
for an Aboriginal offender was also found not to be a bar in looking at 
sentencing options.47 As well, even if incarceration was inevitable, 
judges had to look at the length of the period of incarceration for an 
Aboriginal offender. In part this was because of the fact that racism 
towards Aboriginal offenders was “rampant in penal institutions”.48 
The problem with this proposed methodology is that it is not clear 
how the necessary information will come before the court. With regard 
to this issue the Court said: 
… it will be extremely helpful to the sentencing judge for counsel on 
both sides to adduce relevant evidence. Indeed, it is to be expected that 
counsel will fulfil their role and assist the sentencing judge in this way.49 
Where the accused was unrepresented the Court indicated that it was 
still “incumbent upon the sentencing judge to attempt to acquire 
information regarding the circumstances of the offender as an aboriginal 
person”.50 
What judges were to do if counsel were not being particularly helpful, 
or if there were no defence counsel present, was not really addressed in 
the decision. The Court appeared to assume that changes to the way that 
Aboriginal people were sentenced in Canada would occur just because 
the Court said that they should. Sadly, this assumption has not turned 
out to be correct. Why this particular dictate of the Court has not been 
followed while other decisions have received more prompt attention will 
be discussed later. 
The Court wanted to make clear that while section 718.2(e) mandated a 
different way in which an Aboriginal person was to be sentenced, it did 
not mean that on all occasions an Aboriginal person would receive a 
                                                                                                            
45
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 91 (S.C.C.). 
46
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 83 (S.C.C.). 
47
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 92 (S.C.C.). 
48
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 68 (S.C.C.). 
49
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 83 (S.C.C.). 
50
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 84 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) ABORIGINAL OVER-REPRESENTATION 697 
different sentence than a non-Aboriginal person in similar circumstances. 
The Court’s reasoning in this area has led to a great deal of confusion. 
The Court stated: 
 Yet, even where an offence is considered serious, the length of the 
term of imprisonment must be considered. In some circumstances the 
length of the sentence of an aboriginal offender may be less and in 
others the same as that of any other offender. Generally, the more violent 
and serious the offence the more likely it is as a practical reality that 
the terms of imprisonment for aboriginals and non-aboriginals will be 
close to each other or the same, even taking into account their different 
concepts of sentencing.51 
For some, the last sentence of the paragraph is the determinative one. 
On this reading, while the methodology for determining a fit sentence 
for an Aboriginal offender might be different than if the offender were a 
non-Aboriginal person, once violence is involved, the result will be the 
same. This interpretation reduces R. v. Gladue52 to standing for the 
proposition that in cases of violence Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
offenders will receive the same sentence. This seems to be an odd 
message to take from a decision that spends most of its time talking 
about the problem of over-representation. It also ignores the fact that 
Jamie Gladue pleaded guilty to manslaughter — clearly a violent offence. 
Nevertheless, as reductive as this viewpoint might seem, it was picked 
up very quickly, particularly by Crowns and judges who might not agree 
with the other aspects of the Court’s decision. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF GLADUE ON THE COURTS 
The waters were further muddied a year later in 2000, when the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in R. v. Wells.53 Wells was one of a 
series of cases that came to the Court regarding the interpretation of the 
conditional sentencing provisions of Bill C-41.54 Mr. Wells was an 
Aboriginal person convicted of a sexual assault at the Tsuu T’inaa First 
Nation outside of Calgary, Alberta. He was sentenced to 20 months’ 
imprisonment. The matter went to the Alberta Court of Appeal, which 
                                                                                                            
51
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 79 (S.C.C.). 
52
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
53
 [2000] S.C.J. No. 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.). 
54
 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, 
S.C. 1995, c. 22. 
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considered section 781.2(e) and fresh evidence provided by the appellant 
but nevertheless upheld the sentence. This appeal was heard before the 
R. v. Gladue55 decision and so the Supreme Court reviewed the fitness of 
the sentence in the context of that decision. At this hearing before the 
Supreme Court there was only one intervener, Aboriginal Legal Services 
of Toronto. 
In another unanimous decision, this time by Iacobucci J. alone, the 
Court once again emphasized that R. v. Gladue56 mandated a different 
methodology, not necessarily a different result. The Court went on to say: 
 The generalization drawn in Gladue to the effect that the more 
violent and serious the offence, the more likely as a practical matter 
for similar terms of imprisonment to be imposed on aboriginal and 
non-aboriginal offenders, was not meant to be a principle of universal 
application. In each case, the sentencing judge must look to the 
circumstances of the aboriginal offender. In some cases, it may be that 
these circumstances include evidence of the community’s decision to 
address criminal activity associated with social problems, such as 
sexual assault, in a manner that emphasizes the goal of restorative 
justice, notwithstanding the serious nature of the offences in question.57 
At the same time, the Court upheld the sentence of imprisonment even 
though the fresh evidence provided to the Court of Appeal provided 
treatment options in a non-incarceral setting.58 As with Gladue, the case 
could be seen to stand for the proposition that sentence parity with non-
Aboriginal offenders is the norm for violent offences or for the proposition 
that this is expressly not the case. 
After dealing with Aboriginal-specific criminal cases for three years 
in a row (R. v. Williams,59 R. v. Gladue60 and R. v. Wells61), the Court has 
not revisited this area since 2000. In the interim, conflicting lower court 
decisions dealing with Aboriginal people convicted of violent offences 
have fallen into two camps. 
One set of decisions focus on the portions of R. v. Gladue62 and R. v. 
Wells63 that stress that serious and violent offences are still subject to 
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restorative sentences and that sentence length must be considered in all 
cases. Not surprisingly, this line of cases generally approves of conditional 
sentences or sentences with a shorter period of imprisonment than sought 
by the Crown.64 
The other set of decisions refers only to the sentence in R. v. Gladue 
that argues for sentence parity with non-Aboriginal offenders65 and the 
restatement of this notion in R. v. Wells.66 Once again it is not surprising 
to find that the resulting sentences pursuant to this manner of interpretation 
are incarceral sentences, rather than conditional sentences, and are 
consistent with the Crown’s position on the length of the sentence.67 
R. v. Gladue68 dealt with the interpretation of a section of the 
Criminal Code69 that was expressly concerned with sentencing. One of 
the live questions arising from the decision was the extent to which the 
decision could be extended to other areas involving the treatment of 
Aboriginal offenders by the justice system. 
The first area where this issue arose was in bail decisions. Justice 
Brent Knazan of the Ontario Court of Justice addressed this matter in a 
paper he presented to the National Judicial Institute in 2003.70 He noted 
the systemic barriers faced by Aboriginal accused persons, including, as 
the Supreme Court of Canada noted in R. v. Gladue,71 a greater reluctance 
to give bail to Aboriginal accused persons. The consequence of this 
practice is that without reliance on Gladue principles, many Aboriginal 
offenders will have effectively served their sentences by the time their 
plea is entered. The reason for this, of course, is that the amount of dead 
time they will have accrued will be equal to, or in excess of, what they 
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might have received had they pleaded guilty at their first opportunity. 
The imposition of a “time-served” sentence precludes any meaningful 
consideration of the Gladue principles on sentencing. As a result, Justice 
Knazan concluded that the Gladue principles applied on bail hearings.72 
This viewpoint was adopted by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in 
R. v. Bain.73 
The decision by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Sim74 extended 
the reach of R. v. Gladue75 still further. R. v. Sim was an appeal of a 
decision by the Ontario Review Board regarding an application for release 
by an Aboriginal person who was found not criminally responsible and 
confined to a secure psychiatric facility. Justice Sharpe, for the Court, 
quoted extensively from R. v. Williams76 and R. v. Gladue and concluded: 
 I do not think that the principles underlying Gladue should be limited 
to the sentencing process and I can see no reason to disregard the 
Gladue principles when assessing the criminal justice system’s treatment 
of NCR accused.77 
The National Parole Board has adopted a similar view and now requires 
that Gladue principles be considered when Aboriginal offenders have their 
parole hearings. 
The result of decisions such as these has been to expand the reach of 
R. v. Gladue78 to virtually every occasion in which the liberty of an 
Aboriginal person is at risk. The implications of this expansion of the 
principles will be discussed later. 
V. ABORIGINAL OVER-REPRESENTATION SINCE GLADUE 
Although R. v. Gladue79 clearly set out a direction for judges and 
expressly gave them the mandate to address the issue of Aboriginal 
over-representation as best they could through the sentencing process, 
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the reality is that despite the enactment of section 718.2(e) and Gladue, 
rates of Aboriginal over-representation have continued to increase. 
As a contemporary statement of the problem, the Office of the 
Correctional Investigator, in its 2005/2006 report, estimated that the 
incarceration rate for non-Aboriginal people is 117 per 100,000 adults. 
The incarceration rate for Aboriginal people is almost 10 times higher 
— 1,024 per 100,000 adults.80 
At the time R. v. Gladue81 was decided, Aboriginal people made up 
12 per cent of all federal inmates and 19 per cent of all sentenced inmates. 
By 2004/2005 Aboriginal people accounted for 17 per cent of admissions 
to federal custody and 22 per cent of admissions to all provincial 
correctional facilities.82 The same trend is observable for young offenders 
as well, although the level of over-representation is worse for Aboriginal 
young people.83 If this is progress, it is progress of the worst kind. 
Julian Roberts and Ronald Melchers reviewed admissions to provincial 
correctional facilities from 1978 to 2001. The study found that over that 
period the number of Aboriginal people in custody increased from 14,576 
to 15,349, while the number of non-Aboriginals decreased from 76,526 to 
65,576.84 Interestingly, the post Bill C-4185 period, including a few years 
after the R. v. Gladue86 decision, did not have any impact on Aboriginal 
incarceration rates. 
 What is mystifying is why the number of aboriginal admissions to 
custody did not decline at an accelerated rate (compared to non-aboriginal 
offenders) from 1996 onwards, as a result of the sentencing reforms 
introduced that year and the subsequent judgments from the Supreme 
Court within the next few years. In fact, although it encompasses only 
a few years (1997-1998 to 2000-2001), the post C-41 period reveals an 
increase in the volume of aboriginal admissions to custody of 3%, 
while non-aboriginal admissions declined by fully 27%. This is quite 
                                                                                                            
80
 The Correctional Investigator Canada, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator 2005-2006 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2006), at 11. 
81
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
82
 “Adult Correctional Services in Canada 2004-2005” (2006) 26 (5) Juristat, at 15-16. 
83
 J. Latimer & L. Foss, A One-Day Snapshot of Aboriginal Youth in Custody Across 
Canada: Phase II (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2004), at ii; see also J. Rudin, 
“Incarceration of Aboriginal Youth in Ontario 2004-2006 — the Crisis Continues” (2007) 53 Crim. 
L.Q. 260. 
84
 J. Roberts & R. Melchers, “The Incarceration of Aboriginal Offenders: Trends from 1978 
to 2001” (2003) 45 Can. J. Crim. & Crim. Just., at 211. 
85
 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, 
S.C. 1995, c. 22. 
86
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
702 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
the reverse of what would be expected in light of sentencing reforms 
specifically addressing the plight of aboriginal offenders. After all, 
both statutory reforms and appellate jurisprudence during this period 
encouraged judges to consider the use of alternatives to incarceration 
for all offenders but to pay particular attention to the circumstances of 
aboriginal offenders. 
 This suggests that these developments, including a proliferation of 
publications highlighting the issue, codification of a special direction 
to judges (and its subsequent endorsement by the Supreme Court), and 
the creation of a new alternative to imprisonment (the conditional sentence 
of imprisonment) have all failed to benefit aboriginal offenders to quite 
the same extent as non-aboriginal offenders. ...87 
The continued rise in over-representation of Aboriginal people in 
prisons is not really that mystifying. First, as was noted earlier, section 
718.2(e) is not an Aboriginal sentencing provision. It is a provision of 
general application that mentions consideration of Aboriginal offenders 
at the end of the section. The section in no way suggests that judges 
should not look for alternatives to incarceration for non-Aboriginal 
people. What the statistics show is that courts find it easier to come up with 
alternatives for non-Aboriginal offenders than for Aboriginal offenders. 
The same situation applies with regard to young offenders. The Youth 
Criminal Justice Act,88 which came into force in 2003, contains many 
restraints on the use of imprisonment for young people. The Act also 
includes the equivalent of section 718.2(e) (a greater discussion on this 
section of the YCJA follows later). Incarceration statistics following the 
implementation of the YCJA show rates of Aboriginal over-representation 
increasing. In the case of young offenders, fewer Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal youth are being sent to jail, but the drop in imprisonment 
rates for non-Aboriginal offenders is much greater than that for Aboriginal 
offenders. As a result, rates of Aboriginal over-representation continue 
to rise.89 
The key reason that rates of Aboriginal over-representation have not 
decreased is that the process by which judges are to get information 
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about Aboriginal offenders proposed in R. v. Gladue90 does not work in 
practice. As courts have repeatedly stated, Gladue is in no way a “get 
out jail free card” for Aboriginal offenders.91 Aboriginal offenders do not 
receive a discount in their sentence by virtue solely of being Aboriginal. 
Gladue emphasizes that in order to craft a different sentence for an 
Aboriginal offender, judges need information, both about the offender 
and about the systemic factors that have played a role in the life of the 
offender. 
It is not surprising that judges are not getting this information. Defence 
counsel do not have any particular knowledge or expertise on the systemic 
factors that have led to Aboriginal over-representation. Nor do defence 
counsel necessarily have the skills to gather information on the life 
history of their client. Law schools still spend very little time teaching 
about sentencing and sentencing submissions. While a vital part of the 
work of defence counsel, sentencing is rarely the subject of continuing 
legal education sessions. Even if counsel do possess the skills necessary 
to gather the requisite information for a substantive sentencing submission, 
they do not necessarily get remunerated for this work. In many legal aid 
plans a guilty plea is a guilty plea — regardless of the work that is put 
into the plea. While it would be nice to think that money should not be a 
factor in this area, that view would reveal a striking degree of naivety. 
Theoretically, issues of the kind raised in R. v. Gladue92 could be the 
subject of pre-sentence reports (“p.s.r.s”). Although some provinces 
indicate that they include Gladue considerations in their p.s.r.s, the 
reality is that this is a very hit and miss process. In some provinces the 
amount of time a probation officer can spend on a p.s.r. is prescribed 
and might preclude taking the time necessary to acquire the requisite 
information. As well, the scope of many p.s.r.s, particularly for adult 
offenders, is simply to determine whether the offender is suitable for a 
community disposition, not what that disposition might be. For the most 
part, the reality is that the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders in the 
post-Gladue world proceeds very much like it did pre-Gladue. When the 
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prevailing ethos is “business as usual” then there is no reason to expect 
that sentencing practices will change. If sentencing practices do not change, 
then rates of Aboriginal over-representation will not change either; indeed, 
they may worsen. 
One might wonder why the direction from the Supreme Court of 
Canada to change the way Aboriginal offenders are sentenced has not 
met with the same response as other decisions of the Court. For example, 
when the Court stated that delays in getting matters to trial meant that 
charges would be thrown out of court,93 governments responded by 
building more courthouses and appointing more judges. When the Court 
mandated more expansive disclosure rules,94 disclosure practices changed 
quickly. Recently, the Court required a change to the laws regarding 
those held on security certificates95 and an amended law was passed by 
Parliament within months. Should not all directions from the Court be 
addressed promptly? 
The key difference between R. v. Gladue96 and the other examples 
cited above is that in the latter cases, failure by the government to act 
would mean that potentially guilty people might go free or be released 
from custody. Inaction on these issues would lead to serious questions 
from the opposition, editorials in newspapers and the fanning of fears for 
public safety. On the other hand, inaction in response to Gladue means 
that Aboriginal people continue to go to jail. While this development 
clearly constitutes “a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system” in 
the eyes of the Court, it does not carry the political baggage that being 
“soft on crime” carries. 
VI. GLADUE COURTS AND GLADUE REPORTS 
In 2000, the Ontario Conference of Judges and the Canadian 
Association of Provincial Court Judges held their annual conference in 
Ottawa. One of the focuses of discussion at the conference was sentencing 
Aboriginal offenders post-R. v. Gladue.97 According to Justice Knazan: 
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There was much interest and discussion that revealed stark problems. 
Four years after s. 718.2(e) was proclaimed and almost two years after 
the judgement in R. v. Gladue, there was confusion about how to 
consistently apply the section. The problems were fundamental; many 
judges had difficulty even knowing when an Aboriginal offender was 
before the court.98 
At the conference, discussions began with judges from the Old City 
Hall Court in Toronto, representatives from Aboriginal Legal Services of 
Toronto and Professor Kent Roach (who represented ALST before the 
Supreme Court in R. v. Williams,99 R. v. Gladue and R. v. Wells100) about 
creating a specialized court that dealt only with Aboriginal people. In 
October 2001, the Gladue (Aboriginal Persons) Court began hearing 
cases at Old City Hall. The court now sits two days a week. Two other 
Gladue Courts have been established in Toronto, one at the College 
Park Court and the other at the 1000 Finch Court. All Gladue Courts 
deal with bail hearings and sentencing Aboriginal offenders. The courts 
do not do trials. 
In order to support the Gladue Court, ALST created the position of 
the Gladue Caseworker. It is the role of the Gladue Caseworker to prepare 
written reports on Aboriginal offenders at the request of the judge, 
defence or Crown. The reports, known as Gladue Reports, are generally 
prepared only where there is a strong likelihood that an offender will 
receive a period of incarceration as part of his or her sentence. 
Gladue Reports go into great detail concerning the life circumstances 
of the offender. All efforts are made to speak with friends, family members 
and anyone who can shed light on the life of the person. The reports 
extensively quote interviewees verbatim. The reports also place the 
individual’s life circumstances in the context of the systemic factors that 
have affected Aboriginal people. The reports also contain concrete plans 
as to alternatives to incarceration. For example, if the report suggests 
that the offender take a program for substance abuse, an application to  
a program will often have been completed and an acceptance date 
received prior to the report being filed. ALST will, if necessary, provide 
the funds to allow the offender to attend the treatment centre if it is out 
of town. Over the past two years, ALST has created additional positions 
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for Gladue Aftercare Workers, to assist clients in meeting the terms of 
their sentence or bail conditions. 
What this means in practice is that a judge who is in receipt of a 
Gladue Report will have a greater understanding of the life of the 
offender before him or her and of how systemic issues have impacted 
that life, and there will also be a very detailed plan presented that will 
attempt to address the factors that have led the offender into the criminal 
justice system. Gladue Caseworkers prepare reports in Toronto and in 
the Hamilton/Brantford area. In some cases the reports are ordered in 
Gladue Courts; in many cases they are not. 
Evaluations of the program have shown that Gladue Reports have an 
impact on the sentences that are handed down to Aboriginal offenders. 
Campbell Research Associates found that judges, Crown counsel and 
defence counsel all agreed that Gladue Reports enable the courts to better 
meet the requirements of the Criminal Code101 and the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act102 regarding the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders.103 Crown 
attorneys often changed their position on sentence after receiving a 
Gladue Report.104 All the judges interviewed in the evaluation agreed 
that the reports formed a sound basis for a sentence.105 
The experience of the Gladue Courts and Gladue Reports shows that 
jail need not be the default option when sentencing Aboriginal offenders. 
It also shows that there is a need to consciously address how to do things 
differently if change is going to occur. 
VII. R. V. KAKEKAGAMICK 
The need for adequate information to allow judges to make an 
informed sentencing decision was front and centre in the Ontario Court 
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of Appeal decision in R. v. Kakekagamick.106 Mr. Kakekagamick, a first-
time offender in his late twenties, was convicted in Kenora, Ontario of 
aggravated assault against his girlfriend. At his sentencing there were no 
substantive submissions to the Court with respect to the applicant’s 
Aboriginal background and no reference was made to R. v. Gladue.107 
While the trial judge made reference to the fact that the offender was an 
Aboriginal person, she failed to consider any of the principles raised in 
the decision.108 
When the matter came before the Court of Appeal, neither defence 
counsel nor the Crown cited R. v. Gladue109 in their factums or raised it 
in their argument. The Court of Appeal took the unusual step of ordering 
another pre-sentence report — which it referred to as a Gladue Report — 
and reserved judgment until the report was received.110 
In a unanimous judgment by LaForme J., the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the lack of any substantive consideration of R. v. Gladue111 
on sentencing was an error of law. The effect of the error of law was to 
require the Court to sentence the appellant anew on the basis of the fresh 
evidence that the court requested.112 
R. v. Kakekagamick113 makes it clear that failure to address the 
issues raised in R. v. Gladue114 when sentencing an Aboriginal offender 
is an error of law that requires the offender to be resentenced by a Court 
of Appeal. It is not enough for the sentencing judge to note that  
the offender is Aboriginal and mention Gladue in passing to render the 
sentence appeal-proof. On the contrary, where defence counsel or the 
Crown fails to address the Gladue factors, the judge must take it upon 
himself or herself to launch such an inquiry. Kakekagamick clearly 
raises the bar in terms of the expectations placed on all parties when an 
Aboriginal offender is sentenced. 
R. v. Kakekagamick115 is not without its problems, however. While 
the Court of Appeal was quite forthright in declaring that the sentencing 
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judge had erred, it nevertheless sentenced Mr. Kakekagamick to a five-
year sentence — the same sentence as the trial judge imposed. Thus, even 
though there was no real consideration of R. v. Gladue116 at the initial 
sentencing and even though the pre-sentence report relied upon at that 
sentencing was found of little use, the Court of Appeal essentially 
upheld the sentence. The Court’s rationale for this decision was that the 
offence was “serious and violent” and so there was no reason to depart 
from the sentence that would have been imposed on a non-Aboriginal 
offender.117 In this part of its interpretation of Gladue and R. v. Wells,118 
Kakekagamick sides with the status quo. 
VIII. THE CHARTER, GLADUE AND ABORIGINAL  
OVER-REPRESENTATION 
Where does the Charter fit into all of this? In R. v. Gladue119 there is 
a very brief discussion of section 15(2). Counsel for Gladue argued that 
section 718.2(e) was, in some ways, an affirmative action program and 
therefore protected under s. 15(2) of the Charter. The respondent felt that 
this viewpoint amounted to reverse discrimination against non-Aboriginal 
offenders. The Court chose not to wade into the section15 waters. 
There is no constitutional challenge to s. 718.2(e) in these proceedings, 
and accordingly we do not address specifically the applicability of s. 15 
of the Charter. We would note, though, that the aim of s. 718.2(e) is to 
reduce the tragic overrepresentation of aboriginal people in prisons. It 
seeks to ameliorate the present situation and to deal with the particular 
offence and offender and community. The fact that a court is called 
upon to take into consideration the unique circumstances surrounding 
these different parties is not unfair to non-aboriginal people. Rather, 
the fundamental purpose of s. 718.2(e) is to treat aboriginal offenders 
fairly by taking into account their difference.120 
This is not to say that section 15 might not play a role in ensuring that 
Gladue remains the applicable law in the sentencing of Aboriginal 
offenders, at least until the promise of the 2001 Throne Speech is met. 
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When the federal government drafted its new Youth Criminal 
Justice Act,121 an equivalent section to 718.2(e) was absent. A number of 
reasons were suggested for why such a section was missing. On the one 
hand, it was suggested that the existing wording in the Act, while not 
mirroring section 718.2(e), made the same point. On the other hand, the 
more cynical viewpoint was that the government felt that the law was 
going to be enough of a challenge to pass given concerns from the Bloc 
Québécois that the law was too repressive and restricted innovations 
being carried out in Quebec, and concerns from the Reform Party that 
the law was too lenient on young offenders. As was noted earlier, the 
one area that the Bloc Québécois and the Reform Party agreed on was 
their displeasure with section 718.2(e). Keeping it out of the YCJA would 
stop these two opponents of the legislation from banding together on 
this issue. 
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto appeared before the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs to raise its 
concerns about the omission of a 718.2(e) section in the bill. As part of 
its submissions ALST said that allowing adult Aboriginal offenders to 
avail themselves of the provisions of section 718.2(e) but denying 
Aboriginal youth that opportunity was a violation of section 15. ALST 
promised to launch a Charter challenge against the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act122 if it was not amended.123 ALST had secured funding from 
the Court Challenges Program124 to launch such a case. 
The Senate made only one amendment to the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act125 before sending it back to Parliament one last time for approval. 
That amendment was to put the wording of section 718.2(e) in two 
sections of the YCJA. While it is impossible to determine the original 
intent of the framers of these amendments, it would appear that concerns 
for fairness and equality of treatment of Aboriginal youth were part of 
the motivation behind the Senate’s decision. When introducing the 
amended YCJA to Parliament for its final approval, then Minister of 
Justice Martin Cauchon noted that the amendment essentially ensured that 
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Aboriginal youth were now treated in an equal fashion to Aboriginal 
adults.126 
One of the ways in which the impact of sections such as section 
718.2(e) can be blunted is by legislation mandating minimum sentences. 
One of the purposes behind minimum sentence laws is to tie the hands 
of judges and to prevent them from relying on other sentencing options 
such as conditional sentences. While the Conservative Party has recently 
introduced a number of bills adding minimum sentences to the Criminal 
Code,127 the previous Liberal government was not shy in introducing 
new mandatory minimums as well.128 
The fact that mandatory minimums restrict attempts by judges to 
address over-representation is a by-product of a more generalized desire 
by legislators to direct judges in sentencing offenders for certain 
offences. Whether an intended consequence or not, the use of mandatory 
minimums cannot help but make it harder to reduce levels of Aboriginal 
over-representation. This suggests that there might well be a role for 
section 15 when an Aboriginal offender is being sentenced for an offence 
where there is a mandatory minimum. 
Although this issue has not yet come before a court of appeal, the 
Ontario Court of Justice has considered it on at least two occasions. In 
R. v. King,129 Knazan J. found that mandatory minimum provisions for 
Aboriginal people convicted of second or subsequent impaired driving 
offences violated section 15 and could not be saved by section 1. The 
precise nature of the infringement in this case arose, in part, because of 
the specific nature of the impaired driving provisions. Section 727 of the 
Criminal Code130 gives the Crown discretion to introduce evidence of 
previous impaired driving convictions. Upon proof of prior convictions 
the judge is required to impose at least the mandatory minimums. The 
Crown’s discretion as to whether or not to introduce prior convictions 
distinguishes this mandatory minimum from others in the Criminal Code. 
                                                                                                            
126
 Canada. House of Commons, January 30, 2002, 37th Parliament, 1st Session Edited 
Hansard, No. 135, at 1535, available online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/ 
parlbus/chambus/house/debates/135_2002-01-30/HAN135-E.htm#Int-113678>. 
127
 Bill C-10 (1st Sess., 39th Parl., 2006) in particular proposes adding a number of new 
minimum sentences for a variety of firearms offences. 
128
 Bill C-2 (S.C. 2005, c. 32), passed by the Liberal government, added minimum sentences 
to 11 sexual offences; in some cases the minimum sentences were as low as 14 days’ imprisonment. 
129
 [2007] O.J. No. 2099 (Ont. C.J.). 
130
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) ABORIGINAL OVER-REPRESENTATION 711 
In his analysis, Knazan J. noted that R. v. Gladue131 makes clear that 
“the Canadian penal justice system has historically discriminated against 
Aboriginal people, generally and in particular through the excessive 
incarceration of aboriginal persons in a systemic manner”132 and that 
section 718.2(e) was Parliament’s attempt to address this discrimination. 
Because mandatory minimums preclude a sentencing judge “from 
considering an aboriginal person’s particular circumstances and [mandate 
a judge] to sentence an aboriginal offender to jail, a sentencing judge 
may perpetuate the historical and continuing discrimination against 
aboriginal people”.133 
Justice Knazan concludes his section 15 analysis by saying: 
 The effect of the impugned legislation is to return aboriginal 
offenders, and only aboriginal offenders, to a situation in which the 
historical discrimination against them is an established fact. It is localized 
and severe. It deprives them of the benefit of s. 718.2(e), which was 
enacted to address the discriminatory treatment of aboriginals by 
sentencing courts.134 
The remedy was to grant Mr. King a constitutional exemption to allow 
him to argue for a non-incarceral sentence in his case. 
Importantly, Knazan J.’s reasoning was grounded on R. v. Gladue135 
and its analysis of Aboriginal over-representation. Section 718.2(e) was 
seen as the method by which over-representation could be addressed, 
but it was not the motivating factor for finding discrimination in the 
mandatory minimum provisions. 
Another judge of the Ontario Court of Justice came to the opposite 
conclusion in a similar case.136 The decision in King137 has not been 
appealed by the Crown.138 It will have to wait until a later date to see 
whether this decision will have more universal application. Such challenges 
can be expected as legislation requiring more and more mandatory 
minimums take effect. 
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Since the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision in R. v. 
Gladue139 there have been concerns that the portion of section 718.2(e) 
dealing with Aboriginal people might be repealed. Given the antipathy 
to the section expressed by both the Conservative Party and the Bloc 
Québécois, it is certainly possible to imagine a scenario in which this 
takes place. 
Even if this part of the section were repealed, however, that would 
not necessarily negate the impact of R. v. Gladue.140 The findings of that 
decision did not rest on the existence of a section of the Criminal 
Code.141 That the Canadian criminal justice system has failed Aboriginal 
people is a finding of the Supreme Court of Canada. That finding did 
not rest on the passage of section 718.2(e). The Court made clear that 
this section was Parliament’s attempt to address the issue of Aboriginal 
over-representation. Repealing section 718.2(e) will not make the reality 
of Aboriginal over-representation go away. 
Further entrenching R. v. Gladue142 in the legal landscape are decisions 
such as R. v. Bain143 and R. v. Sim.144 The reasoning behind these 
decisions is that Gladue extends beyond the sentencing process. Since 
section 718.2(e) does not apply to bail, review board or parole hearings, 
repealing the section will not change the law in these areas mandating 
consideration of the Gladue principles. In the event of repeal, it would 
be open to counsel to argue that Gladue is still the definitive case on 
sentencing even if section 718.2(e) no longer exists. 
What is more problematic is the fact that despite R. v. Gladue,145 
Aboriginal rates of over-representation continue to rise. Given the finding 
that the criminal justice system has failed Aboriginal people, is there the 
possibility of a section 15 challenge to the lack of action on over-
representation? Does the fact that the only Gladue Courts in Canada are 
located in Toronto give rise to a challenge from Aboriginal offenders in 
other jurisdictions? 
There certainly could be strong arguments marshalled in favour of a 
section 15 challenge to government inaction in the face of R. v. Gladue146 
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and rising rates of Aboriginal over-representation. A finding that the 
criminal justice system has failed Aboriginal offenders is a finding that 
the system does not treat Aboriginal offenders in the same way that other 
offenders are treated. 
The problem, of course, is that a successful challenge would require 
that the courts compel governments to direct resources to address this issue. 
As recent section 15 jurisprudence has shown, courts are increasingly 
reluctant to embark on such a road. Making matters more difficult is that 
empirical evidence does not yet exist to show precisely what governments 
should do to address the problem. While the lack of definitive solutions 
is not a bar to innovation, indeed it should spur on new approaches, the 
fact that there are no easy-to-describe, inexpensive, off-the-shelf responses 
to the problem would likely inhibit courts from moving to require 
government action in this area. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
That the Charter will not serve as the instrument by which Aboriginal 
over-representation is wrestled to the ground is not a condemnation of 
the Charter or the courts. It is a recognition of reality. Section 718.2(e) 
and R. v. Gladue147 provided a groundwork upon which change could 
occur. While this change is not happening fast enough, if indeed it is 
happening at all, it does not mean that the effort should be abandoned. 
Initiatives such as Gladue Courts and Gladue Reports, the day-to-day 
efforts of counsel, the work of Aboriginal organizations, the commitment 
of funding and programming by governments and the continued expansion 
of Gladue by the courts will all play a role. 
Real societal change cannot come from courts. They can help spur 
action but that is as far as they can go. In the face of indifference or 
hostility, the most progressive decisions will simply be ignored. R. v. 
Gladue148 has given the opportunity for more widespread recognition 
and action on the problem of Aboriginal over-representation. It is up to 
those who are committed to seeing such change occur to do what they 
can in the areas that they occupy to see that the opportunity is not wasted. 
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